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Abstract: 
 
Globalization as a corporate-led process has come under much justifiable criticism. This 
paper attempts to give the term analytic content distinct from its more ideological 
formulations.. It then focuses on a normative analysis of globalization from the capabilities 
perspective. A freedom-centered perspective such as the capabilities approach emphasizes 
policies and institutions that can enhance freedom globally and locally. A global 
governance structure based on transparent principles  of both economic efficiency and 
social justice is shown to be a desirable state of affairs; however, the present fractured 
process of  globalization is more likely to end up in a fragmenting regionalism or even 
national protectionism and rivalry. Multilateral cooperation on the basis of the framework 
advanced here is an urgent necessity.To this end the creation of international regimes of 
cooperation in areas ranging from trade and finance to ecological and women's and 
minorities rights issues must be put on the international and national social and political 
agendas. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
             Globalization as a corporate-led process has come under much justifiable criticism. 
This paper attempts to give the term analytic content distinct from its more ideological 
formulations.. It then focuses on a normative analysis of globalization from the capabilities 
perspective. A freedom-centered perspective such as the capabilities approach emphasizes 
policies and institutions that can enhance freedom globally and locally. A global 
governance structure based on transparent principles  of both economic efficiency and 
social justice is shown to be a desirable state of affairs; however, the present fractured 
process of  globalization is more likely to end up in a fragmenting regionalism or even 
national protectionism and rivalry 
 
 
           The main purpose of this paper is thus to address a puzzle and suggest strategies 
towards solutions that are freedom-enhancing. The puzzleis: why is there such a tendency 
towards regionalization and even nationalist protectionism despite the rhetoric of 
globalization, the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs( International Financial 
Institutions), and the recognized merits of a rules-based global system? The main argument 
offered is that there is a contradiction in the heart of the current US and the IFIs-led 
globalization that stems from their seeming refusal to understand the implications of 
unevenness in the real world. This also has led to their neglect of some vital principles of 
global justice. By ignoring issues of equity, the current leaders of globalization now risk 
losing economic efficiency if the world becomes further fragmented. Thus, my purpose is 
to try to understand ‘globalization and its discontents’(Stiglitz 2002,2006, Khan1994, 
1995a,b, 1996,1997a,b,c,,1998,1999a,b,2004a and b,2005,2007, Khan and Liu 2008), and 
offer some guiding principles to move forward. 
 
 With frequent use the word globalization has by now acquired the status of an 
academic cliché. For many, the twin tendencies of the globalization of production and the 
emergence of a new international division of labor represent deep structural transformation 
of the world economy. In some sense, this is clearly true. But as some observers have 
recently pointed out (Harris, 1998, Khan, 1998) the word globalization, as commonly used, 
is largely a descriptive and not an analytical category. Furthermore, as a descriptive term its 
proper use requires a historical perspective that is often missing in the vast and growing 
literature. When viewed historically, it appears that globalization is a contradictory process 
of international economic integration that was severely interrupted by the first world war, 
the great depression, and the second world war. The emergence of the Bretton Woods 
framework can be seen as a way to integrate the world with respect to trade while 
controlling the flow of private capital. The demise of Bretton Woods has set in motion 
forces of capital account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of 
‘globalization’. However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities as evidenced 
by the Mexican and — more recently and even more dramatically — by the Asian financial 
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crisis. At the same time integration of trade even within the standard neoclassical 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model would imply a fall in the wages of unskilled workers of 
the north thus increasing inequality there (Krugman, 1996; Wood, 1994). The south is 
supposed to experience a more equalizing effect through trade; but empirically, there is 
very little evidence of this happening. Therefore, it is necessary to treat the rhetoric of 
globalization with caution. At best, we are experiencing a `fractured’ globalization (Harris, 
1998).  
 
Nevertheless, during the past few decades, the structural changes that took place in 
the world economy have brought about increased cross-border economic relations and, 
relatively speaking, a global economy. The internationalization of trade and foreign 
investment, aided by the worldwide deregulation of financial markets, has promoted 
economic integration and regional unions (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997).  A new division of 
labor and a qualitatively different type of resource utilization, production and capital 
accumulation have emerged. The most significant effect of the recent structural change in 
world economy has been the creation of global interdependence and an economic global 
village.  
 
Although integration of the world economy is not exactly new, these structural 
changes have added up to a qualitative alteration in the organization of global markets, 
namely, one involving a shift away from international trade towards international 
production and the domination of international finance and the man-made brainpower 
industries (Thurow,1996). As Cook and Kirkpatrick (1997) put it, 
 
The internationalization of economic activity is not a new 
phenomenon...The recent growth in international 
integration is qualitatively different, however, from the 
earlier expansion of international trade, in that it has been 
characterized by the intensification of economic linkages  
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that transcend national boundaries, often at the functional 
level (p. 55). 
  
 In the previous years of economic integration, international trade and the reduction 
of trade barriers played the leading role in integrating the world economy while in today's 
global economy the main key players are multinational corporations and the growing 
finance and capital markets as well as information and computer technologies. 
 
Since the early 1980s, multinational corporations have increased not only in number 
but have also seen their share of foreign investment grow tremendously. In the early 1990s, 
there were about 37,000 multinational corporations that controlled some 170,000 affiliates 
and the global stock of FDI constituted about $2 trillion (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997). 
Today, some multinational corporations' turnover is greater than the GNP of some 
developing countries. 
 
Globalization has also been enhanced by the rising importance of the financial 
market and financial institutions that are dominating global economic relations. 
Deregulation of the financial market and liberalization of foreign exchange policies have 
increased the flow of finance between countries and brought about the integration of the 
world economy. 
  
As the effects of globalization and regionalisation are felt in every part of the world, 
social scientists have begun examining and debating these two concepts, their relationships, 
and the implication they are likely to have on the growth and welfare of developing 
countries. Among scholars there are clearly areas of dispute. Some scholars such as Hirst 
(1995) question whether there is such a thing as a globalized economy while others 
(Thurow, 1996; Ohmae, 1996) suggest that a qualitatively new form of economic 
integration has set the stage for the emergence of globalization and regionalization. Also, 
social scientists debate whether globalization and regionalization are enhancing the welfare 
of developing countries or marginalizing them, and thereby perpetuating regional and 
socioeconomic inequality. 
  
In this paper I will examine the essence of globalization and regionalization, their 
relationship, and the implications they may have for developing countries in particular. I 
will also point out the contradictions between the global flows of capital and the local needs 
and sensibilities. At the end, we will see that this contradiction points to a need for 
understanding both the structural and normative aspects of globalization especially as it 
relates to development. 
 
Fractured Globalization Within a Normative Framework of Analysis 
  
 As mentioned at the beginning, globalization has been the buzz-word of the 1990s. 
As a process of change, globalization extends beyond the realm of politics and economics 
to embrace science, culture and lifestyles (Griffin and Khan, 1992). As such, globalization 
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is a "multi-dimensional phenomenon applicable to a variety of forms of social action--
economic, political, legal, cultural, military and technological--and sites of social action, 
such as the environment" (Perraton et al, 1997: 258).  
There is no consensus among scholars as to the definition of globalization, or its 
effect on our lives and behavior. Some scholars have attempted to explain globalization as a 
political concept (Gills, 1997) while others elucidate the concept within the framework of 
recent economic, political and environmental developments (McGrew, 1992). Some focus 
on the positive impact of globalization; still others emphasize its adverse effects on income 
and social inequality, women and the poor (Sen, 1997, Gills, 1997).  Others underscore the 
impact of globalization on the nation states and argue that "nation states have already lost 
their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today's borderless 
world" (Ohmae, 1996:11). Yet others focus on the contradictory forces of integration and 
fragmentation in a postmodern world (Khan, 1998; chapters 6 and 7, 2002a,b, 2003, 
2004a,b, 2007). 
 
Since globalization has significant implications for numerous nations, individuals 
and communities, it is imperative to clearly define and examine its implications. A sine qua 
non for this is to conceptualize the term clearly. In this paper globalization is 
conceptualized as asset of cross-cutting economic, technological, cultural and 
communicative processes that have grown enormously since the end of WWII.. In simple 
terms globalization refers to the integration of the world economy in such a way that what 
is unfolding in one part of the world has clear, sustained and observable repercussions on 
the socioeconomic environment and lifestyles of individuals and communities elsewhere.  
As McGrew puts it, globalization is "the forging of a multiplicity of linkages and 
interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system, 
as well as the process by which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can 
come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant 
parts of the globe" (1992, p.262). However, in order for the term to have genuine analytical 
significance it must be a part of a theory of globalization.  Furthermore, in order for 
significant policy implications to emerge the theory must have a normative focus as well. 
Khan (1998) has proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world. In brief 
outline the structural forces in the global economy push towards integrating markets and 
regions. However, many markets are embedded in national economies; there are also non-
market aspects of social and cultural lives of people that are threatened. As a result we find 
the contradictory phenomena of McWorld and Jihad (Barber, 1995). The creation of a 
genuine global society, which many see as the ultimate outcome of globalization then 
necessitates meeting the requirements of global justice. Khan (1998) mentions at least 5 
areas, where the norms of global justice must evolve (among others): 
 
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric system 
of payments which penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only them to 
bear the costs of adjustment needs to be made a global burden sharing 
institution. The World Trade Organization, similarly, needs to acknowledge 
the historical imbalances in the world trading system. For example, 
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specialization according to static comparative advantage may lock the 
developing countries in a relatively backward situation in the emerging 
global division of labor. 
 
2. International capital flows:  From the perspective of many people in the 
developed economies capital flight to LDC’s (with or without free trade 
agreements) may constitute a barrier to well-being, at least in the short-run. 
At the same time foreign direct investment in LDCs may create only low-
wage, marginal jobs (Wood, 1994). A just approach to FDI must consider 
the effects on both the north and south in terms of self-determination. A 
controlled capital flow accompanied by improvements of wages and 
working conditions in the south may be the most desirable solution. 
 
3. International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has been 
increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice 
demands in terms of the relationship between the north and south. Other 
things being equal, the enforcement of strict environmental standards would 
seem to be just. However, such standards may destroy the livelihood of 
some people in the south, it is sometimes argued. A global tax and transfer 
scheme would seem to be the precondition for applying a global set of 
environmental standards. The transfer of ecologically sound technology 
systems from rich to the poor countries is a precondition for justice in this 
sphere. 
 
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing 
discussion pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal in 
order for them to develop their social capabilities. Most studies (e.g., 
Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Khan, 1985; James and Khan, 1993) have 
discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the poor hampers poverty 
alleviation strategies. Redistributing assets and developing their human 
capital so that the poor can have access to markets becomes a major 
necessity in our normative framework. In most parts of the world this will 
require structural reforms rather than marginal policy interventions. 
 
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be 
assessed carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender inequalities 
that so far have affected women’s capabilities negatively demand 
unequivocally that policymakers pay careful attention to enhancing (or at 
least not decreasing) women’s capabilities. Will the globalization help 
women to overcome social limitations ranging from lack of nutrition to 
limits on participation in social, economic and political life? Unfortunately, 
the answer is unclear. In so far as many developing country women do not 
possess skills for the global market place, globalization is already hurting 
them. 
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 These five examples are meant to be illustrative only. By no means do they exhaust 
all the pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, we could 
add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its implications 
for justice). But they do illustrate both the problems and prospects for justice in the age of 
globalization. One of the major political problems we have not discussed so far is the 
weakening of national sovereignty that the call for global economic justice entails. 
Agreeing to a global mode of production and distribution constrained by the principles of 
justice does mean surrendering considerable authority to international agreements, 
conventions, and ultimately, perhaps to new international organizations. It should be 
observed, however, that even without the constraining role of justice the globalization 
process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized countries (e.g., 
NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as well as other issues such 
as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in the light of reasonable 
principles. The fundamental message is that among these principles that of freedom as 
rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal one. This is one rational (perhaps 
the only one) approach if we are to avoid both the Scylla of Jihad and the Charybdis of 
McWorld. 
  
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real economic, 
financial and technological integration. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including interest rates and exchange 
rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of capital between nations. Until then 
the world financial system was governed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 which 
provided for fixed exchange rate where currency values were expressed in terms of dollars 
and gold. When the system was abolished in 1971 by the Nixon administration and 
replaced by a floating exchange rate, the grounds for a global market were laid. 
 
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that became the "only game in town" 
following the ascendance of political conservatives -- Reagan in the U.S., and Thatcher in 
Great Britain. It was further reinforced by the collapse of the former socialist countries and 
the emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of thought 
(Falk, 1997). All these factors created a conducive environment for the free movement of 
goods including capital goods, and services as well as finance, thereby seemingly creating 
an integrated global economy.  In Khan(2003) the causes of this fractured and contradictory 
but nonetheless integrating moment in the world economy are analyzed in detail. Here we 
take the process as given and ask why it is not working so well as its proponents have 
claimed by considering the implications for developing countries in particular. For a more 
extensive discussion covering the developed world as well Stiglitz(2006) is a good guide. 
 
A Social Capabilities Ethics for Global Economic Justice 
 
Siglitz and others have made a serious contribution towards understanding the 
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problems of neoliberalism in our world. What we can attempt here is to integrate this 
positive analysis with the normative position towards globalization and global economic 
justice as sketched in this essay earlier. Some traditional economic approaches to 
normativity via ordinal or cardinal utilitarianism is too narrow as Sen and others have 
pointed out. The Rawlsian primary goods approach goes much further but also falls short of 
a comprehensive integration of positive and normative aspects in a world of diverse cultural 
and political traditions(Sen 1992, Khan 1998). The capabilities approach can be proposed 
as an alternative. Nussbaum(1995) proposes an "Aristotlean" approach with  lists of 
capabilities. Sen has been somewhat reluctant to endorse a particular list once and for all. 
The "Hegelian" social capabilities approach suggested by Khan(1998, 2003) endorses a 
certain open-endedness   with respect to a list but emphasizes the irreducible social, 
economic and political institutional context of capabilities in a dynamic, historical setting.1 
Keeping these important qualifications in mind, an illustrative list is nevertheless helpful in 
concretizing discussions regarding capabilities ethics.  
 
In the particular context of globalization of  finance, for example, sound finance and  
economic growth may go together under an appropriately designed global economic 
regime. However, the results of growth must still be evaluated from the point of view of 
human well-being. In the standard utilitarian approach this can be done by choosing an 
appropriate social welfare function(SWF) where both levels of income and the distribution 
of income are arguments. Given a preference for equality at a given level of income, 
technically certain SWFs are the only admissible ones.2 
 
A more elaborate evaluation of well-being has been proposed by various theorists drawing 
upon the insights of Adam Smith. Sen is the originator of this “capabilities approach” in 
recent times. As mentioned above, the theoretical criticisms of the utilitarian approach by Sen Nussbaum 
and others that this approach reduces all qualities into quanta of utilities is a serious one.  Nussbaum gives a 
graphic example of this by quoting the exchange between Mr. Gradgrind, economist and grief-stricken 
father, and his pupil Bitzer.  Bitzer outdoes his mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality 
that cannot comprehend a father's grief.  I have pursued a similar line of criticism in a number of recent 
papers, and in my book “Technology, Development and Democracy3. This approach makes the capabilities 
explicitly social and asks: what concatenation of economic (real and financial ) and other (e.g., political, 
social etc.) institutions will allow capabilities to be both increase steadily on the average and tend to equalize 
them among diverse individuals? In effect, as the following discussion makes clear, we are asking: how can 
we increase and equalize real, positive freedom for individuals? 
 
 In discussing the well-being implications of sound global  finance in particular and globalization in 
general, therefore, I wish to take a version of the social capabilities approach. It is not my intention here to 
present detailed empirical indicators of well-being and how these are affected by the crisis and its aftermath. 
This is the subject of a future volume. Here I  simply wish to pose clearly the conceptual problem of 
                              
1
 See below for further references and elaborations. 
2
 For example, Schur-concave SWFs are such “equality preferring” SWFs. 
3
 See Khan (1998; 1997c). 
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evaluating the consequences of reforms. The institutional reforms and changes proposed here, and by 
scholars who suggest alternative structures , must be proven to be capability enhancing, or at least not to be 
capability-reducing..But first we still need to ask:  What is meant by capabilities both abstractly and 
concretely? 
 
 Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, 
maintained, nurtured and developed.  They can also (under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe 
confinement) be diminished and even completely lost.  I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social 
(not merely biological) character of these human capabilities.  Sen himself emphasizes "a certain sort of 
possibility or opportunity for functioning. 
 In order to assess financial reforms and structures from a capabilities perspective we need to go 
further and try to describe more concretely what some of the basic capabilities may be.  David Crocker has 
given an admirable summary of both Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay.  
Mainly relying on Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown below), he has compiled a list that is worth 
reproducing here: 
 
 Basic Human Functional Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", respectively; the 
quoted items come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted). 
 
1. Capabilities in Relation to Mortality 
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is possible 
1.2.  1.2. N: Being able to be courageous 
2. Bodily Capabilities 
2.1. N and S: "Being able to have good health. 
2.2.  2.2.  N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished. 
2.3. N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter 
2.4.  2.4.  N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction" 
 2.5.  N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place 
3. Pleasure 
 3.1. N and S: "Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasurable 
experiences 
 
4. Cognitive Virtues 
 4.1.  N: "Being able to use the five senses" 
 4.2.  N: "Being able to imagine" 
 4.3.  N: "Being able to think and reason" 
 4.4.  N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed/ 
 
5. Affiliation I (Compassion) 
 5.1.  N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" 
 5.2.  N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude" 
   
6. Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency) 
 6.1.  N: "Being able to form a conception of the good 
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          S: "Capability to choose ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values 
 6.2.  N and S: "Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life" 
 
7. Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice) 
 7.1.  N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings,      to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction" 
 7.1.1.  N: Being capable of friendship 
       S: Being able to visit and entertain friends 
 7.1.2.  S: Being able to participate in the community 
 7.1.3.  N: Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice 
 
8. Ecological Virtue 
 8.1.  N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of 
nature" 
   
9. Leisure 
 9.1.  N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities" 
  
10. Separateness 
 10.1.  N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's 
 10.2.  N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context" 
  
11. Self-respect 
 11.1.  S: "Capability to have self-respect" 
 11.2.  S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame" 
 
12. Human Flourishing 
 12.1.  N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural  
         possibilities" 
 12.2.  S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings" 
 
 To facilitate this ordering, it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to "infuse" 
but not "organize" the other virtues.  Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with Sen's.  Sen's and 
Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points.  For Sen, the bodily capabilities and functionings (2) are 
intrinsically good and not, as they are in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental 
means to other (higher) goods.  In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily 
functionings that are chosen and intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive 
activities that form part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion and 
other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep" (forthcoming).  She may want to say that intentional 
bodily actions that lead to being well-nourished and healthy are intrinsically good, but that being 
healthy or having good digestion are not functionings (because not intentional) and are valuable only 
because of what they enable us to do.  Another option open to her would be to adopt Sen's view that 
bodily states and processes, whether intentional or not, both as intrinsically and instrumentally good but 
as less valuable than other inherently good capabilities/functionings. 
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 Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items 5 and 8-10, for which Sen has no counterparts.  
These items are welcome features.  Item 8, which I have called "ecological virtue", is an especially 
important recent addition to Nussbaum's outlook.  In a period when many are exploring ways of 
effecting a convergence between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is important that an 
essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for other species and for ecological systems.  
Worth considering is whether Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough.  Perhaps it should be 
formulated to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as 
intrinsically valuable."  Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the 
"spirit of seriousness."  What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's list, their absence on 
Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions?  
One hypothesis is that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention, in her Level 1, to the 
limits, vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence.  Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer 
conception of human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far more than the 
scientific intellect."  On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a virtue that 
enables him to find common ground with Rawls and to establish links with the Kantian ethical 
tradition, in which moral agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves, as 
ends-in-themselves.  
 
 Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central 
importance.  One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another.  At most, one can do 
so in a very limited way.  They cannot be reduced to a common measure such as utility. 
 
 As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and justice going far 
beyond simple distribution of income considerations.  If one accepts the capability approach as a serious 
foundation for human development, then it follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a 
complete evaluation of the impact of economic policies.  
 
 
 In evaluating  international financial regimes and national economic policies  from this perspective 
not only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding human 
freedom.  In particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain things.  Thus, creation of markets 
and efficient production by itself would mean very little if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits.  Worse 
yet, if  markets and other institutions led to phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased 
unemployment, reduced consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups such as women 
and minorities then they will not even be  weakly equitable  global economic structure.  On the contrary, 
under such circumstances, the global markets and other financial institutions will be strongly inequitable 
from the capability perspective. 
 
It is because of this perspective that the earlier positive analysis of the problems of global financial 
markets and institutions need to be put in a completely transparent “social capabilities” framework. Such a 
framework is openly normative and makes a strong ethical case for helping the disadvantaged increase their 
capabilities towards achieving equality of capabilities. Thus poorer nations and poor  people in the global 
economy deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global financial architecture. As 
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Khan(1998) shows in the context of adopting innovation structures leading to increased productivities, 
ultimately the aim of any increase in productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. Such freedom, as Sen 
(1999) points out has both an instrumental value and an ultimate value. Instrumentally, freedom as social 
capabilities can lead to a further increase in productivity. Thus even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis 
must address this aspect as an empirically relevant issue. 
 
The thrust of this paper so far has been to show how bad theories---- regardless of their ideological 
leanings, left, right or center---- can lead to bad policies. Likewise, a refusal to face up to serious ethical 
issues of equity and well-being for all can also lead to a  troubled society. As we move towards the creation 
of a global society where individuality and  rich diversity reflected in differences of cultures and social 
practices leading to well-being  are equally respected, we can do no less than a genuine attempt to approach 
the reforming  of old financial structures and building new financial institutions with a clear ethical 
perspective of global citizenship. Efficiency and equity are both important and sometimes can be achieved 
together. At other times at least short run trade offs must be considered carefully. Here, the advances in 
economic theory --- both positive and normative--- can play a modest but useful role. Therefore, In the realm 
of crisis prevention and crisis management, the minimization of costs and the maximization of the benefits 
from any  financial system must  be guided by advances in both  positive economic theories and  in  
economic ethics. The next two sections discuss some of the implications of globalization generally for the 
developing countries and a particular example, namely the Asian financial crisis. From both the general and 
the particular considerations, the main thesis regarding the dangers of a naïve neoliberal approach is 
confirmed. Furthermore, the need for policies that are (social) capabilities-enhancing is also confirmed. 
 
 
 
Implications for Developing Countries   
 
 Regarding the intense discussion on the effect of globalization on the welfare and 
economic growth of developing countries, the dominant view appears to be that closer 
economic integration will enhance the flow of goods and services as well as factors of 
production, and hence promote economic growth and the welfare of all people. It is 
believed that globalization will result in a better division of labor, allowing developing 
countries (where labor is abundant) to specialize in labor intensive commodities while 
permitting developed countries to use their workers in more productive ways (The 
Economist, 1997a). It is also argued that globalization will allow capital to move in 
accordance with the productive investment opportunities and thereby increase the returns to 
capital. 
 
Others (Falk, 1997; Khan, 1996; Sen, 1997, Sen 1999 Stiglitz 2002,2006) reject this 
argument and contend that globalization and regionalization has largelyl benefited the 
powerful economic entities, thereby marginalizing weak regions and nations. It is argued 
that globalization, while increasing the importance of service industries and skilled labor, 
also reduces the importance of primary commodities and unskilled labor. The revolution 
made in biotechnology, microelectronics and the like have eroded the importance of raw 
materials. Consequently, countries which were once considered wealthy, endowed with 
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natural resources, are no more in the list of rich countries. It is no wonder that, today, the 
richest man in the world is Bill Gates, the owner of Microsoft. The advancement made in 
technology has not only changed the structure of inputs but it also changed their 
significance. Modern industries use fewer natural resources and as a result their importance 
has fallen out of  the competitive equation. In modern economy, technology, knowledge 
and skills stand as the only source of comparative advantage (Thurow, 1996).  Such a 
scenario puts developing countries, the main exporters of primary goods and unskilled 
labor, in a very disadvantageous position.  
 
Moreover, globalization is already  forcing developing countries to operate in 
accordance with the discipline of the global market, limiting the effectiveness of their 
national development policies(Khan 1998,2004a and b,Chang xxxx, 2007. Bonvin (1997) It 
has been known for quite some time by economists that the autonomy and effectiveness of 
national economic policy disappear when there is unrestricted capital flows across borders. 
Furthermore, the growth in the global financial market and highly mobile private 
funds are weakening the ability of countries' central banks to manage exchange rates and 
design effective and sound macroeconomic policies ( Khan2004b,UNCTAD 2006,2007).  
Thus in terms of both growth and distribution the developing countries as awhole 
are losing out. The success of China and earlier the East Asian economies was based on 
strategic integration where national trade, industrial and financial policies were relatively 
autonomous. Ironically, China--- where inequalities have grown remarkably during the 
high growth period and domestic demand can be expanded by using reserves--- is now 
supporting finance the profligate spending patterns of the very rich in the richest country of 
the world by buying an enormous amount of low-yielding US government bonds. There are 
systemic reasons for this but it can not be denied that this ararngemenbt has given the 
global economy as a whole a deflationary bias and have kept the standard of living inside 
China low, not allowing the poorer segments to benefit equally from the remarkable growth 
over almost three decades. The real dangers of Western corporate interest led globalization 
was brought home when once successful East Asian economies liberalized their financial 
markets in the 1990s, only to face the most severe financial crisis(Khan2004 and b; 
Stiglitz2002,2006). China and India survived the crisis mainly because they had refused to 
liberalize their capital accounts. 
 
An Example of the Contradictions of Globalization : From Asian Miracle to the Asian 
Debacle during the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
 An illustration of the instabilities inherent in the forces of financial integration 
sweeping over the globe is the recent financial crises that began in Southeast Asia and later 
engulfed Korea. To some extent the Japanese recession and debt overhang also worsened 
because of the developments in Southeast Asia and Korea. A disintoxicated view of the 
Asian miracle and globalization is necessary in order to put the crisis and its implications in 
perspective. 
 
 A brief recapitulation of the crisis will show that the Thai crisis that began on July 
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2, 1997 and the subsequent contagion effects were all results of a number of factors present 
in various degrees in all the affected economies. These factors include but are not limited to 
a de facto fixed exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar, short-term borrowing and 
loans to dubious ventures in sectors such as real estate. The export slow down of 1996 had 
already created balance of trade deficits. When speculative attacks against currencies such 
as Baht, Ringgit and Rupiah began the central banks could no longer defend these 
currencies. But the crises that erupted were not simple currency crises. Soon the banking 
sector was affected. First there was illiquidity and finally insolvency for a large number of 
banks and other financial institutions. Eventually, the real economies were affected, most 
severely in case of Indonesia. In that country the economic crisis led to a full blown 
political crisis ending the thirty year rule by Suharto. 
 
 There is broad agreement now as to how to characterize the crisis. As Jomo (1998) 
and Khan(2004b) have pointed out, the debate between the IMF and its critics over the 
adjustment programs in these countries revealed many disagreements. However, in the 
policy debates some basic issues regarding the role of globalization in precipitating the 
crisis had not been addressed adequately. 
 
 The region as a whole grew rapidly beginning in the mid-1980s. Devaluations and 
relaxation of rules for foreign investment in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand attracted foreign direct investment (FDI). Fortunately, the high value of the 
Japanese yen (endaka) after the Plaza accord pushed many Japanese companies abroad. 
Some of the Japanese FDI found its way to Southeast Asia. 
 
 It was observed even during the crisis that the fundamentals were sound in 
Southeast Asia (Khan 2002a,b,c,d,e). In other words, fiscal balances were in order, 
monetary policy was not loose and inflation was not high. However, the export-led growth 
in Southeast Asia was also accompanied by bubbles in real estate and financial markets. 
The property and construction booms as well as the stock market booms essentially fed on 
themselves. The expectations of even higher gains tomorrow brought on the high prices and 
investments today. When this giddy momentum of helplessly escalating absurdity 
collapsed, the direction reversed suddenly and precipitously. The rhetoric of boom, which 
was not only banal but also complacent, was replaced by an equally banal rhetoric of doom. 
 
 In these one sided, linear narratives history progresses unidirectionally. However, 
the logic of globalization, as we have been at pains to point out, is much more complex. 
The Asian example shows how unleashing too many market forces at once — in particular, 
liberalizing capital accounts without prudential and other regulations and the ability to 
enforce them can lead to disaster and chaos. 
 
 There are similarities as well as differences between the Mexican crisis and the 
Asian crisis. In both cases there were free falling currencies. In both Latin America and in 
Southeast Asia there were also serious contagion effects. However, one crucial difference 
between the two cases is that the collapse of the Mexican peso and the ‘Tequila effect’ it 
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produced did not lead to the kind of selling off of assets as in the Asian case. The Latin 
American crisis did not develop into a full scale debt-deflation. 
 
 Therefore, the Asian crisis was not just a balance of payments crisis. It was as noted 
before a currency crisis that developed into a full scale and massive debt deflation and 
depression in the real sectors of the economy. One way to characterize this new type of 
currency crisis plus debt deflation is to view these as international capital market failures 
that are the logical results of the currene corporate-led globalization. In the first instance, 
globalized international capital markets have failed to allocate capital optimally — contrary 
to the neoclassical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. As Alan Greenspan blandly 
pointed out during the crisis: `In retrospect, it is clear that more investment money flowed 
into these economies than could be profitably employed at modest risk’ (Greenspan, 1997: 
1-2). In the second place the banking system in the private enterprise sectors failed to 
absorb and channel the large foreign capital inflows. In Stiglitz’s metaphor the banking 
system — more generally the financial system — failed to act as the brain of the economic 
system. In other words, it failed to monitor and evaluate risk effectively. Clearly, the 
lessons from the history of the past crises have not been learned as the most recent 
developments such as the subprime loans crisis that are related to financial deregulation in 
the advanced countries indicate. 
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 Interestingly, the above discussion of the Asian crisis reveals in the East and 
Southeast Asian context the paradoxes of globalization that I have emphasized in this 
essay. As Sobhan (1989) and others have pointed out capitalism in developing countries 
has been led by the state to a large extent. However, the same states that had been 
instrumental in creating a modicum of successful capitalist economies, now seem 
powerless in the face of globalization. This paradoxical situation requires further 
elaboration. 
 
In the developing economies of Asia, for instance, the state is often called upon to 
build the infrastructure for capitalist development. In many cases, the domestic capitalists 
grow as a class with the active support of the state apparatus which they control to a large 
extent. The paradox of Asian development is that the state was quite successful in doing 
this up to a point. But the limits reached by this state-led capitalist development are also 
clear now. 
 
In the 1990s the developing countries in Asia accounted for roughly half of global 
expansion. However, growing by exports also made these economies open to pressures for 
liberalizing the capital markets. For South Korea, which was going to join the OECD group 
such liberalization was seen as a sine qua non. For the other Southeast Asian countries the 
combination of the flow of FDI and finance capital in the emerging markets funds seemed 
to justify further liberalization. A regime of fixed exchange rates and orthodox fiscal and 
monetary policies had already given credibility to these markets. Yet, the state — it turns 
out — can not protect the domestic capitalists in globalized markets as it could before. The 
so-called `crisis of governance’ (Jomo, 1998) is really a crisis of the underdeveloped state 
apparatus which is virtually powerless to deal with the forces of globalization. Thus 
asymmetries in global economic and political power once again are revealed sharply. The 
uneven development of the real and financial sectors are also exposed to the scrutiny of the 
global investors. As confidence in the financial markets collapse, and investors flee with 
herdlike tenacity the weak states can do very little to shore up their domestic capital 
markets. As Siamwalla (1997) commented ruefully there were no alternatives for countries 
like Thailand to submitting to the onerous IMF conditions because of this type of failure of 
the Thai state and the Thai bourgeoisie. Given the complex relationship between the 
bureaucrats, politicians and business in Thailand (Krongkaew, 1997) it was unlikely that a 
coherent response to the crisis could emerge quickly. Under a different setting, the same 
crisis of governance under globalization continues in many countries. 
 
  
 
 In all this, the most important factor is the uneven development of the state 
apparatus in global capitalism. For example, in many Asian countries bureaucrats guiding 
and supervising experts in various specialized areas became relatively efficient at their jobs 
and — partly because of this — quite powerful. At the same time, many of these same 
countries did not have highly proficient experts and powerful bureaucracies for the banking 
and financial sectors. Even in cases such as Thailand where the central bank had a 
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reputation for technocratic ability, the bureaucrats found themselves paralyzed in the face 
of liberalized markets with new institutions such as BIBF (Bangkok International Banking 
Facility) (Lauridsen, 1998).More recent crises such as the Argentine crisis and the rapidly 
developing global subprime loans crisis illustrate the same type of problems of rapid 
liberalization without adequate social supervision and economic regulation. 
 
  
Summary and Conclusions 
 
          Globalization has obviously had some positive impacts such as the transfer of 
technology, raising of productivity in specific sectors, and the improvement of the living 
standard of some people in developing and developed countries. However, current type of 
globalization generally, while benefiting certain regions or groups, is marginalizing and 
distressing the vulnerable and disadvantaged regions and people. This type of corporate-led 
globalization is also forging imbalances among different human needs by privileging the 
acquisition of material wealth over human and spiritual values, resulting in violence, 
alienation and despair. The protests against globalization reflect all these paradoxes. 
 In today's global economy, the importance of raw materials and low skilled labor is 
declining while skilled labor and knowledge, particularly in the field of telecommunication 
and computer technology, are becoming increasingly important. This may put poor nations 
that are the major exporters of primary commodities and low skilled labor at a 
disadvantageous position. 
 
Globalization imposes the rules and discipline of the global market on governments 
and nation states and thus limits the effectiveness of developing countries' national policy, 
including fiscal and monetary policy. As noted by Gilpin earlier, 
 
If a country restricts its money supply in order to fight 
inflation, the consequent rise in the domestic interest rate 
causes an inflow of capital that then defeats the original 
policy objectives and raises the exchange rate. …[I]t is 
impossible to keep the pursuit of domestic objectives 
separate from the stability of the international economy and 
monetary values (1987: P. 145). 
 
 The other negative impact of globalization is its effect on income inequality. As 
explained earlier, globalization has a tendency to increase income inequality between 
nations as well as individuals and regions. Falk  summarizes the opinion of many others 
when he states 
 
 …globalization as historical process is occurring within an 
international order that exhibits gross inequalities of every 
variety, thereby concentrating the benefits of growth upon 
already advantaged sectors with and among societies and 
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worsening the relative and absolute condition of those 
already most disadvantaged .4 
 
 There is also some justifiable concern, given the concentration of economic 
activities and wealth in tripolar regions (North America, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific), 
that the flow of resources to other developing countries may decline, exacerbating the 
financial and economic problems of vast areas such as sub-Saharan African.  While one 
may see globalization and regionalization as inevitable in today's environment, there is an 
urgent need to address the socio-economic problems that arise as a consequence of a global 
market economy. 
 
 In this paper, I have emphasized that the adverse effects of globalization should be 
addressed within the conceptual framework of a just global economy. The suggested 
conceptual approach for this is the capabilities approach. From this perspective any 
movement towards a just global economy will require considerable redistribution of global 
wealth and power. In particular, it will require the currently powerful countries to surrender 
part of their sovereignty to new international organizations which can promote global 
welfare by addressing the asymmetries between the developed and developing countries in 
a timely and equitable manner. The proposed global Tobin tax is one example of how some 
problems of global finance can be addressed multilaterally. If the proceeds from this tax 
can be used to finance development that will enhance the capabilities of the people of 
LDCs so much the better (Ul Haq, et.al., 1996).  
 
             However, the current state of affairs does not hold out much hope for either the 
adoption of a Tobin tax or its benevolent use for development to occur in the near future. In 
the mean time, it is in the interest of the developing countries to exercise whatever relative 
autonomy they have for independent action at the level of a single country, and concerted 
effort at the regional level, to mitigate the adverse effects of a fractured globalization. Such 
limited responses cannot be wholly effective, but are much to be preferred to the policy 
paralysis that seems to have been induced by an uncritical adoption of the dominant 
discourse of globalization. Ultimately, a just global order based on a transparent rule-based 
trading system and global financial architecture can enhance both efficiency and equity; but 
moving in that direction will require the willingness of all the parties--- or at least the major 
developed and developing countries--- to cooperate within the framework presented here. 
 
If the main argument advanced in this paper is correct, the global financial markets in particular need 
monitoring and a proper global financial architecture needs to be erected for both efficiency and equity 
reasons. From the efficiency side the argument ---- in a world of undiversifiable systemic risks---- has been 
quite clearly one of exercising prudence through appropriate national and international institutional 
arrangements that can formulate and implement policies better than in  the past. On the equity side, the 
foregoing argument based on the capabilities approach would lead towards creating institutions and policies 
that protect not just creditors, but also the ordinary citizens. In particular, careful attention must be paid to the 
                              
4
 Falk (1997),p.19, See also Khan(2004b). 
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problems of the disadvantaged and the vulnerable groups. Adequate social safety nets must be in place 
before the crisis, and swift response after the crisis to meet their urgent needs must be ensured. A more 
democratic decision making before the  crisis could better realize such administrative structures. Once again, 
good governance at all levels is essential. If the 21st century is to be  safer with a more civilized  global 
society then these democratic imperatives must be heeded along with the technical advice that economists 
can at times give.  
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